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Introduction
Cloud storage enables users to access their data anywhere and at any time. It achieves the dream of getting computing, storage and communication resources as easy as to get water and electricity. All resources can be gotten in a plug-and-play way. It has the advantages of high scalability, ease-of-use, cost-effectiveness and simplifying infrastructure planning etc. However, the emerging use of cloud storage has led to the problem of verifying that storage server indeed store the data. When users store their data in cloud storage, they mostly concern about whether the data is intact. This is the goal of remote data possession checking (RDPC) schemes.
Remote data possession checking is a topic that focuses on how to frequently, efficiently and securely verify that a storage server can faithfully store its client's (potentially very large) original data without retrieving it. The storage server is assumed to be un-trusted in terms of both security and reliability. There are two types of schemes, namely provable data possession (PDP) and proof of retrievability (POR). The difference between PDP and POR is that POR checks the possession of data and it can recover data in case of a failure. Usually, a PDP can be transformed to a POR by adding erasure or error correcting codes.
In cloud storage, the terminal can be any networked device, including mobile phone, net book and PDA etc. For most of the devices, the computing and storage capacity is limited. Even the capacity is adequate; the users still hope to have the least resources to achieve the checking. So the following requirements ought to be satisfied for a RDPC scheme to be of practical use in cloud storage.
 Acceptable computing overhead, it includes the initialization and verification overheads in the client and the proof generating overheads on the server. It means that the scheme should be efficient in terms of computation.  Acceptable communication overhead, which refers to the total data transferred between client and server. It means that the amount of communication should be low.  Acceptable storage cost, which refers to the additional storage of client and server required by the scheme. It means that the additional storage should be as low as possible.
 The verifier should not be required to keep the original file to be checked. It is enough to store a reduced-size digest of the data. This paper gives an efficient RDPC scheme. It almost satisfies all the requirements listed above. It has several advantages over existing techniques. First, it is efficient in terms of computation and communication. Second, it allows verification without the need for the challenger to compare against the original data, and it can be verified by comparing only the responds returned by the storage server. Third, it uses only small challenges and responses, about 1280 bits (for 256 bits secret key and random number) and 2048 bits (for the size of a RSA modular is 1024 bits) respectively. And users need to store only two secret keys and several random numbers. Finally, based on Euler's theorem, a challenge updating method is proposed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the symbols which will be used later and describes the basic data possession checking scheme and its improvement. Section 3 discusses the security and performance analysis. Section 4 discusses related works and Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Data Possession Checking Scheme

Symbol Definition
To describe the data possession checking scheme, the symbols are defined as follows. 
The Scheme Description
A remote data possession checking scheme generally has five stages, namely Setup, TagBlock, Challenge, ProofGen and ProofVerify. In Setup stage, it generates some initialization parameters, such as the master key k, the encryption key k en and some random numbers. In TagBlock stage, it selects c file blocks randomly to multiply with a random number and then computes the sum of them. And then it encrypts the sum using the encryption key k en as the verifiable tag. The number of verification is t, it needs to compute t times' verifiable tags. In Challenge stage, user computes k 1 i and k 2 i for the i th verification using the master key k, and then sends the tuple < r 3 , r 4 , k 1 i , k 2 i > to storage server. In ProofGen stage, storage server computes the locations of the requested blocks using k 1 i , and computes the random numbers using k 2 i , and then computes the sum of them, F i ′, and finally returns the <F i ′, T i ′> to the user. In ProofVerify stage, user decrypts T i ′ using the tag decryption key k en and checks whether it is equal to F i ′. If yes, it indicates that the file is not destroyed. The detail of the scheme is descried as Figure 1 .
The security of the basic scheme depends on the verifiable tags, namely the confidentiality of the sum of the product of the file blocks and random numbers. So the private of k en is important. In addition, the drawback of the scheme lies in the number of verification is limited. To overcome the drawback, we propose an improved scheme to permit challenge updating. Different from the basic scheme, the improved scheme needs to store some pre-computed data for each file block. After the t time's verification, user can refresh the verifiable tags using the pre-computed data of file blocks. In Setup stage, it generates some initialization parameters, such as the master key k, the encryption key k en , some random numbers and the RSA modulus N and φ(N). In TagBlock stage, it computes a compressed data τ i for each file block. Then the process is same as the basic scheme. After t time's verification, it needs to perform the Challenge-updating process. For the m th updating, it first computes the master key k u m for this updating, and then the process is same as the TagBlock stage. One difference is that it uses the pre-computed data instead of the original file blocks. The Challenge stage is same as the basic scheme, the differences are that it uses k u m as the master key and needs to send a random number α to storage server. In ProofGen stage, storage server first computes the locations of the requested blocks using k 1 i and computes the random numbers using k 2 i . Next, it computes the sum of them, F i ′. Then it computes R = α Fi′ mod N. Finally it returns <R, T i ′> to the user. In ProofVerify stage, user decrypts T i ′ using the tag decryption key k en and gets T i ′′. Next it computes α Ti′′ mod N, then it checks whether it is equal to R. If yes, it indicates that the file is not destroyed. The detail of the improved scheme is illustrated as Figure 2 .
For confidentiality and reliability, the file can be encrypted and encoded in erasure or error correcting codes. 
Security and Performance Analysis
The Security Analysis
The security of the basic scheme depends on the verifiable tags, namely the confidentiality of the sum of the product of the file blocks and random numbers. So the private of k en is important. Because each tag is only used once, so there are no man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks. If an attacker doesn't know the master key k and the encryption key k en , it is difficult for him to construct a sum of some products of a coefficient and a file blocks passing the checking. If N=1024 bit, an attacker constructs a respond passing the checking with probability 2 -1024 . It is probabilistically impossible for the attacker to pass the checking of verifier. The improved scheme just uses the Euler's theorem to achieve challenge updating. The differences between the improved scheme and the basic scheme lie in two aspects. First, in challenge updating stage, it uses the compressed blocks instead of the original file blocks to compute the verifiable tags. Second, in ProofGen stage, it returns α Fi′ instead of F i ′. The security of the improved scheme depends on the private keys and the compressed data τ i for each file block. So the compressed data must be stored encrypted.
Although the schemes are probabilistically secure, the advantages of low network bandwidth and reasonable computation load make the scheme fit for verifying that data stored in cloud storage is actually being maintained.
The Performance Analysis
From the description of the scheme we can see clearly that the overhead is minimal. In Setup stage, it needs to generate some secret keys and random numbers which are necessary for any RDPC schemes. In TagBlock stage, it needs to perform 2t*(1+c) times' cryptographic hash, c times' integer addition and multiplication, t times' symmetric encryption operations. In Challenge stage, it only needs 2 times' cryptographic hash and to transfer about 1024 bits information (for 256 bits secret key and random number). In ProofGen stage, it needs to perform 2c times' cryptographic hash, c times' integer addition and multiplication operations, and then it needs to transfer about 2N bits information. In ProofVerify stage, it only needs one time decryption and comparison operations.
For the improved scheme, it needs to compute compressed data for each file block which will be used repeatedly. In TagBlock stage, the operations are almost same as the basic scheme. In Challengeupdating stage, it needs 2t*(1+c) +1 times' cryptographic hash, c times' integer addition and multiplication, t times' symmetric encryption operations. In Challenge stage, it needs 2 times' cryptographic hash and to transfer about 1280 bits information (for 256 bits secret key and random number). For ProofGen and ProofVerify stage, it has one more modular exponential operation. As integer multiplication operation can be transformed to addition operation. So except for the modular exponential operation, there are only cryptographic hash, symmetric encryption and addition operations. All operations are efficient in computation.
The experiments are running on one PC configured with Intel Core i3 CPU 2.2 GHz and 2 GB RAM. We have measured the average times required for 1024 bits RSA modular exponential operation, SHA-1 for cryptographic hash, AES ECB 256 bits for symmetric encryption and two integer addition operations. Assume the length of a file block is 8KB, then one time 1024 bits RSA modular exponential operation occupies 2340 ms, one time SHA-1 occupies 8.325 ms, 8KB file block encryption using AES ECB 256 bits occupies 6.3221 ms and 8KB file blocks addition occupies 0.0192 ms.
In the scheme, the number of verification and the number of blocks required for each challenge can be set flexible according to users' requirement. If the data will not be stored for a long time, they can be set small to further reduce the overhead.
Related Works
The RDPC schemes are categorized into two types, namely provable data possession (PDP) and proof of retrievability (POR). Usually, a PDP can be transformed to a POR by adding erasure or error correcting codes. Initial solutions to PDP were provided by Deswarte and Quisquater [1] . They use RSA based hash functions to hash the entire file at every challenge. Let N be an RSA modulus, g∈Z N * . The verifier stores a = g F mod N for file F (suitably represented as an integer). To challenge the prover to demonstrate possession of F, the verifier transmits a random element g r . The prover returns s = (g r ) F mod N, and the verifier checks that s = a r mod N. This scheme has the drawbacks of requiring the prover to exponentiate over the entire file F and accessing the entire file's blocks. So is the scheme of Filho and Baretto [2] , but it is used to prevent data corruption in transfer.
Ateniese et al. have done some works on PDP schemes. They first formally define protocols for PDP and present two provably secure PDP schemes in [3] . Both schemes use homomorphic verifiable tags. Because of the homomorphic property, tags computed for multiple file blocks can be combined into a single value. The client pre-computes tags for each block of a file and stores the file and its tags with a server. Then the client can verify that the server possesses the file by generating a random challenge against a randomly selected set of file blocks. Using the queried blocks and their corresponding tags, the server generates a proof of possession. Recently, Ateniese et al. provide a general mechanism for building public-key homomorphic linear authenticators (HLAs) from any identification protocol satisfying certain homomorphic properties in [4] . In [5] , they present a provably secure PDP scheme based on symmetric key cryptography. And the scheme supports some dynamic operations, including modification, deletion and appending.
Xiao et al. provide a scheme based on symmetric key cryptography [6] . The main contribution is that they proposed a challenge updating mechanism based on verification block circular queue to allow the dynamic increase of the number of effective challenges which is similar to our improved scheme. In [7] , they firstly provide a provably secure multiple-replica PDP (MR-PDP) scheme. It allows a client who stores t replicas of a file to verify that the server have held the t copies. Erway et al. present a framework and a construction for dynamic provable data possession (DPDP) [8] , which extends the PDP model to support data updating. In [9] , Sebe et al. present a RDPC protocol such that it allows an unlimited number of verifications and the maximum running time can be chosen at setup time and traded off against storage at the verifier.
Juels and Kaliski introduced the notion of proof of retrievability (POR) and proposed a formal POR protocol definition and accompanying security definitions [10] . Their scheme use disguised blocks, called sentinels, hidden among regular file blocks that the server cannot differentiate from encrypted blocks. In [11] , Shacham and Waters gave two POR schemes. The first one built from BLS signatures [12] and has the shortest query and response with public verifiability. The second one based on pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and has the shortest response with private verifiability, but a longer query. Dodis et al. first formally define the POR code in [13] . The constructions either improve and generalize the prior POR constructions, or give the known POR schemes with the required properties. The main insight of their work comes from a simple connection between POR schemes and the notion of hardness amplification, extensively studied in complexity theory.
In [14] , Schwarz and Miller use XOR-based, parity m/n erasure codes to create n shares of a file that stored at multiple sites. They provide a very clever way to check whether every machine has stored intact each others' data using algebraic signatures. Curtmola et al. distill the key performance and security requirements for integrating forward error-correcting codes into PDP and describe an encoding scheme and file organization for RDPC in [15] . In [16] , Bowers et al. introduce a theoretical framework for PORs. In follow-up work, they introduce HAIL (High-Availability and Integrity Layer) [17] , in which the key insight is to embed MACs in the parity blocks of the dispersal code. As both MACs and parity blocks can be based on universal hash functions, it is possible to create a block that is simultaneously both a MAC and a parity block. Wang et al. firstly study the problem of ensuring the integrity of data storage in cloud computing [18] [19] [20] . In [18] , they utilize homomorphic token and ECC to achieve the integration of storage correctness insurance and data error localization. In [19] , they consider the task of allowing a third party auditor (TPA), on behalf of the cloud client, to verify the integrity of the dynamic data stored in the cloud. In [20] , they also consider introducing a TPA to audit the cloud data storage. They utilize public-key based homomorphic authenticator and uniquely integrate it with random mask technique to achieve a privacy preserving public auditing system. In addition, there are some works on cloud storage or security [21] [22] [23] .
Different from these works, we propose an efficient RDPC scheme which is probabilistically secure but suitable for cloud storage. In addition, based on Euler's theorem, a challenge updating method is proposed.
Conclusions
In this paper, an efficient RDPC scheme is proposed. It almost satisfies all the requirements for cloud storage. It has several advantages over existing techniques. First, it is efficient in terms of computation and communication. Second, it allows verification without the need for the challenger to compare against the original data, and it can be verified by comparing only the responds returned by the storage server. Third, it uses only small challenges and responses, about 1280 bits (for 256 bits
